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ABSTRACT
Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-
based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The
present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be
used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound
remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a
non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2,
participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-
McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the
corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates
were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions.
This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was
not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not
primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution
competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.
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That we are not entirely in conscious control of our behav-
iour, actions, and decisions is something that has been of
interest to both those in the public domain (Gladwell,
2005) as well as many psychologists. Evidence for the
idea that our judgements, behaviours, and reasoning are
not always driven by active thinking, but rather by non-
conscious, implicit processes, comes from a widely investi-
gated phenomenon known as priming. In classic research,
priming refers to changes in a person’s reaction to an item
as a result of previous encounters either with that item or a
related item (e.g., Schacter, Gallo, & Kensinger, 2007). In
semantic priming, participants might be presented with
words, objects, or images that are meaningfully associated
to information presented on a later task. For example, par-
ticipants are either presented words subliminally via
masked presentation, or they are required to consciously
process the stimuli, perhaps via a sentence-scrambling
task. Participants are then given a second task without
being alerted to their relatedness and the influence of
the prior exposure on this task is measured. One classic
task used to investigate semantic priming for example, is
the lexical decision task, consisting of a prime word fol-
lowed by a target that is either a word or a string of
letters. Participants are asked to decide if the target is a
word or not, and standard findings have shown that par-
ticipants are faster to respond if the target is shown after
a semantically related prime (e.g., cat-dog) rather than an
unrelated prime (e.g., lamp-dog).
How might it be that prior exposure to a stimulus can
influence our decisions on a later task without our aware-
ness? A number of theories of semantic priming exist in
the literature (e.g., compound cue theory, Ratcliff &
McKoon, 1981; Becker’s verification model, Becker, 1976),
however, perhaps the most popular of these theories
revolves around the notion of spreading activation. Initially
incorporated into a model of memory by Collins and Loftus
(1975), spreading activation is now widely considered to
account for a number of implicit memory and priming
effects found within numerous domains in psychology.
According to spreading activation accounts, memory is
conceptualised as a network of nodes (concepts) that are
all interconnected by links that vary in strength. Encounter-
ing an item activates its internal memory representation
and this activation spreads to other related concepts in a
network of associations (e.g., Nelson, Kitto, Galea,
McEvoy, & Bruza, 2013; Nelson, McEvoy, & Pointer, 2003).
This increased activation facilitates subsequent retrieval
of that concept as well as related concepts, resulting in
priming effects. Thus, it is easy to see how spreading acti-
vation models can account for semantic priming effects.
Another domain in which spreading activation might be
important is in insight-based problem-solving. Insight-
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based problem-solving tasks are said to involve solutions
that are found via a sudden flash of insight, rather than
by trial and error. Sio and Rudowicz (2007; also see
Smith, 1995; Smith & Blankenship, 1991) have suggested
that this process is enhanced via the occurrence of spread-
ing activation, a process that sensitises participants to
various related concepts that aid problem-solving. One
insight task that has been used to study this is the com-
pound remote associate task (CRAT; Mednick, 1962).
These tasks involve the presentation of three words (e.g.,
apple, family, and house) each of which is associated with
a fourth word, in this case tree, that results in three new
words or phrases (apple tree, family tree, and tree house).
In order to gain insight and solve this problem, theorists
have suggested that a process of spreading activation is
used, one that starts with the presentation of the initial
three words, and continues until the correct concept has
been activated (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios,
2005).
Many models of spreading activation assume that acti-
vation of concepts will decay over time or with intervening
mental activity. However, research is beginning to emerge
that shows that priming can withstand the effects of a
delay. A common theme in this research is that the more
complex and demanding the task, the greater priming
seems to be over a delay compared to less complex seman-
tic tasks (e.g., see Becker, Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joor-
dens, 1997; Woltz & Was, 2007). The ability to prime
performance on complex semantic tasks over a delay has
been shown in a number of new experiments examining
the role of false memories in priming. Where priming
effects have traditionally been studied using memories
for items that were actually presented (i.e., true memories
of things that happened), new research has demonstrated
that false memories can also serve as effective primes. False
memories occur when people remember details or events
that have never occurred. Interest in such memory illusions
has increased in part because they can be easily created
under controlled laboratory conditions using the Deese/
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roedi-
ger & McDermott, 1995). This procedure involves present-
ing participants with lists of words (e.g., truck, bus, train,
and vehicle) all of which are associates of an unpresented
critical lure (i.e., car). Despite not being presented, partici-
pants will often falsely remember the critical lure as
being presented on the list. Although theories vary, a
number of explanations of the creation of false memories
favour the notion of spreading activation. For example,
activation-monitoring theory (Roediger & McDermott,
1995; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) and associative-
activation theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plump-
ton, 2009) propose that processing words on the list leads
to spreading activation to related concepts. These acti-
vated, associated concepts can often be unpresented
items that are later falsely remembered.
It is apparent that the mechanisms underlying the cre-
ation of false memories and those related to general
semantic priming effects are very similar. Therefore, it is
not that surprising to find that false memories have been
used to prime simple implicit memory tests in a similar
manner to true, presented memories (e.g., McDermott,
1997). False memory priming effects have also been
observed in lexical decision tasks (e.g., Sherman &
Jordan, 2011) where it has been found that priming
occurs not just from presented items (true memories) but
also from critical lures (false memories). This is important
because there is evidence that false memories can persist
for longer periods of time than true memories, something
that might be important when understanding long-term
semantic priming. For example, McDermott (1996; Exper-
iment 1) found that although true recall declined, false
recall rates remained constant over a two-day delay.
Thapar and McDermott (2001; Experiment 1) extended
this false memory persistence effect to a delay of one
week and Toglia, Neuschatz, and Goodwin (1999; Exper-
iment 2) extended it to three weeks. Others have success-
fully shown false memory persistence effects using
recognition rather than recall [e.g., Howe, Candel, Otgaar,
Malone, & Wimmer, 2010 (Experiment 3); Payne, Elie, Black-
well, & Neuschatz, 1996 (Experiment 1); Seamon et al.,
2002; Thapar & McDermott, 2001 (Experiment 2)]. The
false memory persistence effect is not restricted to
adults, but is also evident in research with children [e.g.,
Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995; Howe et al. (2010; Exper-
iments 4 and 5)]. Interestingly, the persistence of false
memories may be linked to the fact that they are self-gen-
erated (i.e., arise spontaneously due to spreading acti-
vation) rather than other-generated (i.e., presented by
the experimenter). Because self-generated information is
generally retained better in memory than other-generated
information (Mulligan & Lozito, 2004; Sui & Humpreys,
2015), such information should serve as a better prime
especially following a delay. The important point is that
because self-generated false memories remain robust
over time, their effectiveness as primes seems inevitable.
Importantly, research on false memory priming effects
has recently been extended to priming higher order,
complex problem-solving, demonstrating new levels of
robustness and persistence that priming effects can have
over time. Indeed, research by Howe, Garner, Dewhurst,
and Ball (2010) tested whether false memories could be
used to prime insight-based problem-solving tasks. Here,
participants were presented with DRM lists whose critical
lures served as potential primes for half of the subsequent
CRAT problems that participants were then required to
solve. They found that when participants falsely recalled
the critical lures of the studied DRM lists, corresponding
CRAT problems were solved more frequently and signifi-
cantly faster than CRATs that had not been primed by
DRM lists or CRATs that were primed but the critical lure
had not been falsely recalled. These false memory
priming effects occurred over remarkable delays of not
just 30 minutes, but up to one week (Wilkinson & Howe,
2016). What this suggests is that the activation level of
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the falsely remembered words remained high enough to
spread through memory during the later problem-solving
task. This finding has since been replicated with children
(Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011) and has
recently been extended to recognition tests where, cru-
cially, the locus of these effects have been pin-pointed to
activation of the critical lure during the study phase, not
the test phase, of the paradigm (Howe, Wilkinson, Garner,
& Ball, 2016). That is, priming was equally robust when par-
ticipants only studied DRM lists or when they studied DRM
lists and then received a memory test before solving
CRATs. Similar results have been reported for recall,
where priming effects were equally robust regardless of
whether recall tests were administered (Howe et al., 2010).
Key to the priming effect found in all of these studies is
that they only occur when the critical lure is also falsely
remembered on a memory test. Again, it is not the test
itself that is important to priming effects (Howe et al.,
2010, 2016), but it does help us gauge the strength of
the false memory, something that is critical to whether it
will prime subsequent problem solutions. This theoretical
constraint is particularly important because it suggests
that the ability of false memories to prime insight-based
problem-solving is limited to circumstances where false
memories achieve activation levels that are sufficient
enough to produce recall or recognition. From a spreading
activation account of memory then, false memories that
have been activated during DRM list presentation are still
above threshold activation level and remain active in
memory when participants are trying to solve CRAT pro-
blems. Solving CRAT problems becomes easier because
spreading activation from the CRAT terms to the problem
solution is faster, given that the critical lure is already
active in memory. False memories that were activated
but not falsely remembered are thought to have either
dropped below the activation threshold required for
priming after being rejected during test, or to have not
been activated sufficiently above the threshold required
for priming during study.
Interest in priming effects is not just limited to increases
in solution rates and decreases in solution times but
extends to the ability of primes to bias solution choices.
Many “real-world” problems either have multiple interpret-
ations (with only one leading to the correct solution) or
multiple solutions where the problem-solver must choose
between solutions to find the most effective (adaptive)
one. In terms of the former multi-interpretation problems,
some investigators have conducted implicit memory
experiments where they have attempted to bias which
answer is selected by using homonyms. Homonyms are
words that are pronounced the same but have very differ-
ent contextual meanings (e.g., the word score). In a study
by Eich (1984), participants were presented with critical
pairs of words, the second of which was a homophone
and the first of which was a word intended to bias the
less common context of the homophone (e.g., the critical
pair “movie-REEL”). Eich found that the prior priming of
the uncommon interpretation of the homophone signifi-
cantly biased the spelling participants chose in the sub-
sequent recall task, with participants more likely to
choose the spelling of the word that was consistent with
the primed context. As with theories underlying insight-
based problem-solving and false memory priming effects,
research suggests that the potential meanings of homo-
nyms are accessed via an automatic process. For
example, Eckstein, Kubat, and Perrig (2011) have suggested
that all of the meanings of a homonym are accessed in par-
allel before one of the meanings is selected in a competi-
tive race. Their research has shown that this process is
automatic, whereby the subliminal presentation of a
homonym with a prime facilitated the solution of a
lexical decision task. Interestingly, the supraliminal presen-
tation of the homonym actually slowed the decision
process.
Importantly, new research has also demonstrated that
false memories can bias the selected meaning of homo-
nyms in an analogical reasoning task. In a series of exper-
iments, we developed analogical reasoning problems
that contained homonyms (Howe, Garner, Threadgold, &
Ball, 2015). One meaning of the homonym would lead to
an incorrect solution whereas the other meaning would
lead to correct analogical reasoning. Our findings demon-
strated that when primed with false memories, participants
were better able to supress the unhelpful meaning of the
homonym and made it easier for them to select the
meaning that would lead to the correct solution on the
task.
In terms of the latter multi-solution problems, Kokinov,
Vankov, and Bliznashki (2009) have proposed that when
processing problems with at least two solutions, partici-
pants will usually arrive at the dominant interpretation,
with any other responses being inhibited by the dominant
one. In line with this proposal, research by Gibson (2004)
has demonstrated that the priming of a non-dominant
but correct answer to an ambiguous word problem can
overcome this inhibition and facilitate problem-solving in
participants. In a series of three experiments Gibson
attempted to bias the answer chosen in a number of
lateral thinking problems. Findings showed that processing
information relevant to the non-dominant solution signifi-
cantly biased the production of that solution. However,
priming a solution that is already dominant had no effect
upon solution generation.
As mentioned, previous research has demonstrated that
false memories can implicitly prime solutions to insight-
based problem-solving tasks. However, these false
memory priming effects are limited to instances in which
there is only one correct, and therefore dominant, solution
to a problem, with priming simply raising the activation
level of the only correct response to a problem. The ques-
tion addressed here concerns what happens in instances of
solution competition, where a problem has two possible
solutions fighting for dominance within the semantic
network, and where one of these solutions is ordinarily
MEMORY 3
more dominant than the other? Would priming a non-
dominant solution with a potent false memory enable
biasing away from the dominant solution, as has been
found with true memory priming?
To answer this question, we can turn to theories of
spreading activation (AAT in particular) which suggest
that words do not always have simple associations.
Indeed, they can have multiple sets of associations with
one another, with pathways containing different theme
nodes depending on the context of the association.
When words are activated, not only are associated words
along a pathway activated, but so too are the relevant
themes, ones that in turn activate other relevant themes
and associated words. The more themes that are associ-
ated with a word, the weaker the level of activation will
be from spreading activation, with words with only a few
themes having a stronger level of activation. Problem
tasks with multiple solutions therefore, will have a
number of themes and concepts in memory competing
with one another to be chosen as the correct answer.
The activation of these competing concepts should be
weaker than problems with only one possible meaning
and solution. Similarly, in a problem with two possible
answers, where one is more dominant than the other,
the dominant answer will be more closely related within
the semantic network, allowing spreading activation to
elicit this answer more quickly and more often under ordin-
ary circumstances.
Is it possible then, to use robust and time persistent
false memories to increase the activation level of this
more distant, non-dominant solution to a problem?
Unlike classic semantic priming research, which empha-
sises the impact a prime may have upon the speed of
problem solution, research concerning the biasing of
problem-solving has focused mainly on the rate and
change of solution production, often neglecting to con-
sider the influence a prime can have solution time (e.g.,
Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951; Gibson, 2004). Given previous
robust findings that demonstrate the ability of false
memory primes to also improve the speed of
problem-solving in instances of single solution pro-
blems, one might expect that in instances of solution
competition, false memories are capable of not only
biasing the solution production towards the non-domi-
nant solution, but also decrease the time taken to
produce this solution. The present research set about
testing this using a number of newly created CRAT pro-
blems, ones with multiple solutions. As with previous
research, each CRAT consisted of three words, all of
which could be solved by a single linking word.
However, in this study each CRAT had two possible sol-
utions; a dominant and a non-dominant solution the
latter of which was also the critical lure from a DRM
list. For example, the CRAT police/super/sports could
be solved by the word man (dominant) to form police-
man, superman, sportsman, or by the critical lure from
the car DRM list (non-dominant) to form police car,
super car and sports car. Given the key findings in the
previous series of false memory priming experiments
is that participants must falsely recall the critical lure
in order for it to facilitate problem-solving, a similar
outcome is predicted in the present study. It is pre-
dicted therefore, that false memories will successfully
bias solution production towards the non-dominant sol-
ution, and improve solution times on ambiguous CRATs,
only when the critical lure is falsely recalled.
Experiment 1
In our first experiment, we document the creation and
norming of a set of ambiguous CRATs. These CRATs were
specifically created to have more than one solution. Sol-
ution dominance was determined by asking participants
to solve each of the CRATs and see which of the solutions
was produced more frequently.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate and postgraduate students aged
between 18 and 25 were participated in this norming
study. All participants provided written informed consent
prior to the study and were fully debriefed about the
purpose of the study.
Design and materials
A within-subject design was used, with each participant
completing all 11 CRATs. The order of the CRATs was ran-
domised to reduce any order effects. Critical lures were
taken from the DRM lists provided by Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, and Gallo (2001). Eleven CRAT’s were then
created corresponding to eleven critical lures in these
DRM lists. As with the CRATs used in previous research,
each CRAT consisted of three words, all of which could
be solved by a single linking word. However, in this study
each CRAT had two or more possible solutions, one of
which was the critical lure from a DRM list. For example,
the CRAT police/super/sports could be solved by the
word Man, to form police man, superman, sports man, or
by the critical lure from the Car DRM list, to form police
Table 1. Ambiguous CRATs with two solutions.
CRAT Critical lure solution Alternative solution
Base/territorial/tank Army Water
Board/magic/stain Black Carpet
Goat/bike/boots Mountain Bell
Dough/warm/crumbs Bread Cookie
Salad/juice/sauce Fruit Tomato
Drinking/cake/fruit Cup Tea
Sports/police/super Car Man
Deep/cycle/wave Sleep Water
Note/sheet/chart Music Paper
Bite/eyes/poison Spider Snake
Stick/work/pine Needle Wood
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car, super car and sports car. The complete set of 11 CRATs
is shown in Table 1 (see Roediger, Watson, et al., 2001 for
the corresponding DRM lists).
Procedure
Participants were told that they would see three words on
the screen and would be asked to generate a fourth word
that could be combined with all three words to make a
compound word or phrase. Participants were not informed
that there was more than one possible answer to the
problem. Participants were first given an example, followed
by three practise CRATs before they began. Each CRAT was
presented on a screen, after a fixation cross, in a random-
ised order and participants were asked to provide a sol-
ution verbally. If participants failed to correctly solve a
CRAT, they were given feedback as to the correct answer
after each problem. The solution process was timed, with
participants having a maximum of one minute to complete
each problem before moving to the next.
Results and discussion
The solution rates (solution rate) and times (solution time)
for each newly created ambiguous CRAT problem were cal-
culated. The data were further conditionalised into the rate
at which the critical lure was chosen as an answer (CL sol-
ution rate) and times for both the critical lure solution (CL
solution time) and the alternative solution to the CRATs (alt
solution time). The data for each CRAT is shown in Table 2
in order of critical lure solution rates with CRAT’s most likely
to be solved using the critical lure solution presented first.
As can be seen from Table 2, the study succeeded in
creating 8 ambiguous CRATs each having at least 2 poss-
ible solutions (because the other 3 had 100% solution
rates for only one of the two answers, these cannot be con-
sidered ambiguous). These CRATs vary in overall problem
difficulty (solution rate), with the difficulty varying from
the most difficult cup problem with a solution rate of
20% to the easiest army and fruit problems with solution
rates of 90%. Importantly, the problems also differ in
their critical lure solution rate, varying from those problems
whose dominant answer is the critical lure solution (domi-
nant problems; army, black, fruit, mountain, and bread),
problems without a dominant solution (equal problems;
cup and car), and those problems whose dominant solution
is the non-critical lure, alternative word (non-dominant
problems; water, paper, snake, and wood) (compare
column CL solution choice rate with alt solution choice
rate).
Experiment 2
Having successfully created a number of ambiguous
CRAT’s, Experiment 2 set about testing the hypothesis
that false memories could be used to bias the solution
choice in a manner similar to that demonstrated in the
true memory priming literature. Like the work by Gibson
(2004), the present study attempted to prime two different
categories of ambiguous CRATs; those where the critical
lure was slightly dominant or where both solutions were
equally dominant (control problems) versus those whose
dominant solution was the alternative, non-critical lure sol-
ution (non-dominant solution). The problems selected that
were defined as non-dominant CRATs had an average criti-
cal lure solution rate of 20% and problems that were
defined as control CRATs had average critical lure solution
rate of 53%.
As with the previous research on biasing insight pro-
blems with true memories, a number of different predic-
tions were generated. First, it was predicted that, like
Gibson’s study, priming would bias problem-solving
when the non-dominant answer is primed. This prediction
was made under the assumptions of spreading activation
models of memory, such as AAT, whereby the natural
dominant response is thought to be closer in the semantic
network than the non-dominant response, allowing
spreading activation to naturally activate this answer
more often and more quickly. Thus, it was expected that
priming more distant non-dominant solutions would
allow for spreading activation to facilitate an increase in
the amount (and decrease the time with which) these
answers are chosen.
Second, given that one of the key findings in the pre-
vious series of false memory priming experiments is that
participants must falsely recall the critical lure in order for
it to facilitate problem-solving, a similar finding is predicted
in the present study. In other words, it is predicted that
Table 2. Normative data for ambiguous CRATs.
CL solution Alt solution Solution rate Solution time CL solution choice rate Alt solution choice rate CL solution time Alt solution time
Army Water 0.9 9.69 1 0 9.69 na
Black Carpet 0.63 19.18 1 0 19.18 na
Mountain Bell 0.63 14.93 1 0 14.93 na
Bread Cookie 0.95 14.32 0.82 0.18 13.8 16.61
Fruit Tomato 0.9 13.44 0.67 0.33 13.99 12.33
Cup Tea 0.2 18.89 0.5 0.5 30.25 7.53
Car Man 0.8 12.4 0.42 0.58 9.03 15.18
Sleep Water 0.48 13.59 0.32 0.68 13.5 13.62
Music Paper 0.63 18.37 0.24 0.76 18.52 18.33
Spider Snake 0.65 11.32 0.23 0.77 8.61 12.14
Needle Wood 0.65 18.37 0.04 0.96 31.32 17.85
Note: All solution times are presented in seconds. CL, critical lure.
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false memories will only successfully bias solution choice on
ambiguous CRATs when the critical lure is falsely recalled.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate and postgraduate students aged
between 21 and 40 who did not participate in Experiment 1
were recruited for Experiment 2. All participants provided
written informed consent prior to the study and were
fully debriefed about the purpose of the study upon
completion.
Design, materials, and procedure
A mixed design was used where each participant was
primed on half (three out of six) of the CRATs using the
matching DRM lists and then attempted to solve all six
CRATs. Half of the participants were primed on the three
control problems (see below) and the remaining partici-
pants were primed on the three non-dominant problems.
Participants were randomly assigned different DRM-CRAT
pairings and both the order of the DRM lists and the
order of CRAT presentations were carefully counterba-
lanced to reduce any order effects.
Six ambiguous CRATs were selected from the normative
data produced in Experiment 1. Three problems were
control problems ( fruit, cup, and car; mean backward
associative strength of the CRAT terms to the critical lure sol-
utions = .04 and to the alternative solutions = .12) and three
were specifically selected such that their dominant solution
was the non-critical lure, alternative word (non-dominant
problems; water, paper, and wood; mean backward associat-
ive strength of the CRAT terms to the critical lure solutions
= .07 and to the alternative solutions = .18). Participants
were given three out of the six DRM lists in a randomised
order. None of the items from the DRM lists were present
in the CRAT problems. Each of the three DRM lists was admi-
nistered to participants verbally with a tempo of approxi-
mately 1.5 seconds per word and a-2.5 second break
between the lists, followed by a distractor task (counting
backwards in threes for 30 seconds) before they were
then asked to recall as many words as they could remember
from the list. Once this had been completed for each word
list, participants were then asked to complete all six CRATs.
Participants were first given an example, followed by two
practice CRATs before they began. Each CRATwas presented
on a screen, in a randomised order and participants were
asked to provide a solution verbally. If participants failed
to correctly solve a CRAT, they were given feedback as to
the correct answer after each problem. The solution
process was timed, with participants having a maximum
of one minute to complete the problem.
Results and discussion
CRAT solution rates using either the critical lure or the
alternative solution were calculated as was the mean
CRAT solution rates (proportion correctly solved out of
total) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) for
each participant who solved a CRAT using the critical lure
solution. The data were first conditionalised into the rate
at which the critical lure was chosen as an answer when
primed (primed CL solution rate) and times for the critical
lure solution (primed CL solution time).
To compare whether priming the critical lure had a
biasing effect on the answer selected to solve CRATs, an
independent t-test was conducted comparing the rate at
which the critical lure was chosen as a solution (instead
of the alternative solution) from the normative data, com-
pared with these same rates when the critical lure was
primed. The t-test revealed that the mean critical lure
primed solution rate (M = .64, SD = .13) was significantly
higher than the mean critical lure normative solution rate
(M = .37, SD = .22), t(10) =−2.583, p < .05, d = 1.5. Thus,
priming was effective.
Turning to themain focus of this study, we were primarily
interested in the biasing of selection choice as primed by the
false memory or critical lure. Rather than an analysis for
general CRAT solution rates and times therefore, analyses
were conducted for CRATs solved using the critical lure sol-
ution, excluding the solution rates and times when partici-
pants solved using the alternative solution. This permits a
direct investigation of false memory biasing effects.
False memory rates were at 16% due in large measure
to the fact that backward associative strength on most of
the DRM lists was moderate (M = .28). This is one of the pro-
blems encountered when trying to find lists that are suit-
able for ambiguous CRATs. Critically, there were no
instances of participants falsely recalling the critical lure
and then solving the CRAT using the alternative solution
(i.e., when participants recalled the CL, they either solved
it using the CL, or did not solve it at all). (Note that in
general, rates of alternative solutions in the other con-
ditions matched the normative rates found in Experiment
1.) Therefore, for primed CRATs, 16% of the responses
occupied the primed and did recall the CL category and
84% of the responses occupied the primed but did not
recall the CL category. Clearly, this meant that there was
sufficient power to detect differences between responses
in this latter category and those in the not primed category,
but power to detect differences was considerably lower in
the former category. To anticipate the findings, because
performance on the CRATs was generally superior in the
primed and did recall the CL than in the other two con-
ditions, issues of power were not of concern in this
experiment.
Turning to the specific analyses, for CRATs solved using
the critical lure solution, a single factor (solution type: not
primed vs. primed but did not recall the CL vs. primed
and did recall the CL) repeated measures analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA) was conducted for both solution rates
and solution times. For solution rates, the ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of solution type, F(2, 24) = 7.75, p
< .01, h2p = .39. As shown in Figure 1, and confirmed using a
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post hoc Tukey’s LSD test, solution rates using the critical
lure solution were significantly higher on CRATs where par-
ticipants were primed and had a false memory (M = .92, SD
= .28) than when they were primed but did not have a false
memory (M = .46, SD = .48; p < .01) than when they were
not primed (M = .30, SD = .38). Solution rates did not
differ significantly for items where participants were
primed but did not have a false memory and those that
were not primed (p = .41).
For solution times, the ANOVA revealed no significant
main effect of solution type, F(2, 62) = 1.63, p = .21. Thus,
solution times using the critical lure solution did not
differ when participants were primed and had a false
memory (M = 41.24, SD = 22.81), were not primed (M =
35.22, SD = 26.00), were primed but did not have a false
memory (M = 31.31, SD = 23.16).
These initial findings suggest that, as predicted, partici-
pants solved a higher proportion of CRATs using the
primed critical lure solution rather than the alternative sol-
ution. This effect was only found when participants falsely
recalled the critical lure. Analysis of the solution time data
suggests that although false memories successfully biased
the CRAT problems towards the critical lure, they did not
increase the speed with which participants solved
problems.
Non-dominant solution problems
As well as being interested in whether false memories can
successfully bias the solution choice on insight problems
with more than one solution, the present research was
specifically concerned with whether there were any differ-
ences when biasing non-dominant solution problems. To
examine this question, we analysed the data for only
those CRATs whose non-dominant solution was primed.
As with the overall data, an initial independent t-test was
conducted to determine whether priming the critical lure
had a biasing effect on the answer selected to solve
CRATs for non-dominant problems. The t-test for non-
dominant problems was conducted by comparing the
rate at which the critical lure was chosen as a solution
from the normative data compared with these same
rates when the critical lure was primed. The t-test revealed
that the mean critical lure primed solution rate (M = .54, SD
= .08) was significantly higher than the mean critical lure
normative solution rate for non-dominant problems (M
= .20, SD = .14), t(4) =−3.658, p < .05, d = 2.98. To deter-
mine the role of false memories in this biasing effect, a
single factor (solution type: not primed vs. primed but
did not recall the CL vs. primed and did recall the CL)
ANOVA was conducted for both solution rates and solution
times for those CRATs solved using the critical lure. The sol-
ution rates for those CRAT problems whose non-dominant
solution was primed revealed a significant main effect of
solution type, F(2, 24) = 5.75, p < .01, h2p = .15. As shown in
Figure 2, and confirmed using a post hoc Tukey’s LSD test,
solution rates using the critical lure solution were signifi-
cantly higher on CRATs where participants were primed
and had a false memory (M = .53, SD = .51), than those
who were primed but did not have a false memory (M
= .21, SD = .42; p < .05), and those who were not primed
(M = .12, SD = .33, p < .01). Solution rates did not differ sig-
nificantly between participants who did not have a false
memory or who were not primed (p = .48).
The solution times ANOVA also revealed a significant
main effect of solution type, F(2, 18) = 3.91, p < .05, h2p
= .33. As shown in Figure 3, and confirmed using a post
hoc Tukey’s LSD test, solution times using the critical lure
solution were significantly faster on CRATs where partici-
pants were primed and had a false memory (M = 14.64,
SD = 11.04) than when participants were primed but did
not have a false memory (M = 39.98, SD = 18.49; p < .05)
than when they were not primed (M = 38.36, SD = 28.28,
p < .05). Solution times did not differ significantly
between participants who did not have a false memory
Figure 1. Mean overall solution rates for CRATs solved using the critical lure
solution.
Note: Error bars represent the standard error.
Figure 2. Mean solution rates for non-dominant CRATs solved using the
critical lure solution.
Note: Error bars represent the standard error.
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or who were not primed (p = .89). This analysis suggests
that false memories can bias answer selection on ambigu-
ous insight problems, but only when the non-dominant
solution is primed and when participants falsely recall the
critical lure. This priming not only biases the answer
chosen towards the primed critical lure, but also increases
the speed with which participants then solve the CRAT.
General discussion
The findings from the present research are unique in
demonstrating that as well as being able to prime
insight-based problem-solving tasks, false memories can
also bias the solution choice on these same problem
types. Like previous findings on false memory priming,
the strength of the false memory (as reflected in partici-
pants’ being able to falsely recall the critical lure) was key
to producing the biasing effect. That is, in order for the criti-
cal lure to significantly bias the answer chosen to solve the
CRAT towards the critical lure solution and away from the
alternative solution, the critical lure from the DRM list
must be of sufficient strength in memory to be falsely
remembered during an earlier recall task. This finding has
been replicated in all of the experiments that have
looked at false memory priming on problem-solving
tasks. Of interest is that there were no instances of partici-
pants falsely recalling the critical lure and then solving pro-
blems using the alternative solution. When participants
were primed and recalled the critical lure, they either
solved the CRAT using the critical lure, or did not solve it
at all, suggesting that there was no resistance to using criti-
cal lure solutions.
The strength of false memories as reflected in test per-
formance should not be confused with the locus of these
observed priming effects. That is, we know from previous
research, that it is not the test itself that serves to prime
performance on subsequent problem-solving, but rather
the self-generation of the false memory during encoding.
Specifically, robust priming effects are observed even
when a memory test is absent between study and
problem-solving, and this has been found in both recall
(Howe et al., 2010) and recognition (Howe et al., 2016)
paradigms. In fact, priming effects are not increased by
the presence of memory tests. Specifically, Howe et al.
(2016) showed that when problem solutions were pre-
sented only at test, there was no improvement in solution
times or rates. Moreover, when DRM lists were presented
only at study, solution times and rates were more robust
than in conditions in which DRM lists were studied and
tested prior to problem-solving. Thus, the priming effects
that are routinely observed in experiments like the ones
presented here cannot be accounted for by the fact that
memory tests were administered prior to problem-solving.
Another prediction about the false memory biasing
effect, one that was anticipated from previous literature
on true memory biasing, was that the effect was significant
for the priming of non-dominant problem solutions. That
is, on CRATs with two solutions where there exists one par-
ticularly dominant solution, priming of the other non-
dominant solution not only successfully biased participants
towards solving the CRAT with that solution, but also
decreased the time needed to solve such problems.
The results of this study support other recent research
that has examined the ability of false memories to prime
alternate meanings of homonyms to solve analogical
reasoning problems. Previous research (Howe et al., 2015)
has found that false memories are not only capable of
priming the solution to analogical reasoning problems,
but that they allow one to more easily suppress an interfer-
ing and incorrect homonym meaning, enabling partici-
pants to access a more difficult, but correct solution to
the problem. The present study suggests that false mem-
ories can function in a similar manner in instances of sol-
ution competition. That is, the activation of false
memories can increase one’s chances of selecting an ordin-
ary but uncommon solution over a more dominant sol-
ution to a problem that has more than one possible
answer.
The findings of the present study can be accounted for
using AAT (Howe et al., 2009) whereby the natural domi-
nant response is thought to be stronger and closer in the
semantic network than the non-dominant response, allow-
ing spreading activation to ordinarily activate this answer
more often and more quickly. Priming further away, non-
dominant solutions then, allows for spreading activation
to facilitate an increase in the frequency with which
these uncommon and less dominant answers are chosen
and to also increase the speed of this selection process.
Indeed, spreading activation models of memory provide
a good theoretical framework for which to understand per-
formance on standard implicit priming tasks, priming
within problem-solving tasks, and the false memory
priming effect. The question arises as to whether such
models can also account for the literature on priming
Figure 3. Mean solution times for non-dominant CRATs solved using the
critical lure solution.
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. Times are shown in seconds.
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solution bias. AAT in particular can offer a good account,
due to the recent addition of theme nodes to the model
(e.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010) and the acknowledgement
that activation of concepts in the network not only occur
automatically and in parallel, but that these concepts
may be quite distant in semantic space (also see Nelson
et al., 2003, 2013). AAT acknowledges that words may
have numerous associations with one another and that
pathways may also contain different theme nodes along
them, ones that are also activated during spreading acti-
vation. For example, as suggested by Howe and Wilkinson
(2011), when presented with the words dog and cat, com-
peting theme nodes such as animal or petmay also be acti-
vated. The context in which a word is presented will
influence which theme nodes are activated, which in turn
will influence which associated words are activated via
spreading activation. Insight-based problems with multiple
solutions will therefore have a number of themes and con-
cepts in memory competing with one another to be
chosen. The ability of false memories to boost the acti-
vation level of a concept for a considerable period of
time, therefore, allows for increased activation of the
usually distant, non-dominant solution to the problem,
increasing its likelihood of being selected as a solution.
Although the results of the present research are both
interesting and informative for theories surrounding
semantic priming and false memory, they also have
novel implications regarding evolutionary and adaptive
theories of human memory. One school of thought is
that because memory is reconstructive it gives rise to
both true and false memories (e.g., Howe, 2011; Newman
& Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).
That false memories are just a by-product of a very well
adapted system is one possible explanation of the false
memory priming effects. As Howe et al. (2010) argued,
false memories themselves may serve an adaptive func-
tion, by generating information that can prime and facili-
tate later problem-solving. Indeed, false memories may
serve a higher order adaptive function by self-activating
key information that may be useful for decision-making
and problem-solving (e.g., see Leach, 1994; Leach & Griffith,
2007).
If previous research using false memories to prime
insight problem-solving tasks is correct in its suggestion
that the self-generation of false memories from associative
information can serve to prime later problem-solving in an
adaptive manner, then the findings from the present
research adds to this adaptive theory. The findings of the
present research are novel in that they extend the pre-
viously found positive benefits of false memories to
those situations where more than one possible choice
could be made. Moreover, we have demonstrated that
when complex problems with multiple solutions are avail-
able, false memories can bias which solution is selected.
This is in line with research suggesting that when faced
with a choice, or complex decision, implicit processing is
more advantageous than conscious processing (e.g., the
deliberation-without-attention hypothesis; Dijksterhuis,
Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). Importantly, our find-
ings demonstrated that when naturally weaker responses
were primed, false memories are especially beneficial at
overcoming a dominant response (a dominant response
which could often be incorrect in the face of stress and sur-
vival, e.g., Leach & Ansell, 2008).
Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, and Chance (2002) have argued
that by considering the possible functions our memory
systems have evolved for we gain a greater understanding
of memory in general, and may discover functions of
memory that surprise us. Regarding this, the present
research is the first to extend false memory priming
effects by applying it to the biasing of multiple solution
insight problems. This research yet again demonstrates
the ability of false memories to behave in a similar
manner to true memories and highlights the possible
adaptive functions that associative memory networks
may have for problem-solving.
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